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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
Pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (4), Utah Code Annotated, the Supreme Court
transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. The jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court is under 78-2-2 by reason of this being an appeal from a final Order
of the District Court. The Appellate Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 78-2a-3 (2)(j) by
reason of the transfer from the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
There is a factual dispute of a sufficient nature to warrant the denial of
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
(I)n reviewing a grant of Summary Judgment, we view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993).
The Supreme Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, and will affirm only where it appears that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to Judgment as a matter
of law. Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807,2000 Utah 16, rehearing denied (2000).
Summary Judgments present for review conclusions of law only, because, by definition,
Summary Judgments do not resolve factual issues. Thus, we accord no deference to the
Trial Court, but review its conclusion for correctness. Jeppson v. State Department of
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Corrections, 846 P.2d 485, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Citations omitted).
DETERMINATIVE

RULES AND

STATUTES

1. Rule 56. Summary judgment, (c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The
Motion, Memoranda, and Affidavit shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA4501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
Interrogatories, and Admissions on file, together with the Affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A Summary Judgment, interlocutory in character may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount
of damages.
2. Section 57-11-2 (8) "Subdivided means the owner of any interest in
subdivided lands who offers them for disposition or the principal agent of an inactive
owner.
(9) "Subdivision" and "Subdivided Lands" Means land which is divided or is
proposed to be divided for the purpose of disposition into ten (10) or more units
including land, whether it is contiguous or not if ten (10) or more units are offered as a
part of a common promotional plan of advertising and sale. If a subdivision is offered by
a developer or a group of developers, and the land is contiguous or is known, designated,
or advertised as a common tract or by common name, that name is presumed, without
regard to the number of units covered by each individual offering, to be part of a
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common promotional plan.
(10) "Unit" includes any lot, parcel, or other interest in land separately offered for
disposition.
3. Section 57-11-7 Utah Code Annotated. Attached as Addendum.
4. Rule 4-501 CJA. Attached as Addendum.
STA TEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/Appellant initiated the action herein by reason of a landslide. The
landslide was the result of a scarp created by a stream undercutting the toe of the hill of
Plaintiffs/Appellant's residential lot. The land instability was an inherent defect in the
residential lot which should have been disclosed to the Plaintiff7Appellant and was not
disclosed either by intentional misrepresentation or negligent omission. The
Defendants/Appellees variously were aware of the unstable land and/or should have been
aware of it and/or were advised as to the necessity of putting the residence of
Plaintiff/Appellant as far away from the unstable portion of the land as possible and,
thereby, the Defendants/Appellees had a duty to inform Plaintifi7Appellant as to the
defect of the residential lot of which Plaintiff/Appellant was unaware. The
Defendants/Appellees each filed Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff/Appellant
filed his responses controverting the facts and the law relied upon by
Defendants/Appellees. Upon hearing of the Summary Judgment motions, the Court
granted the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment dismissing
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Plaintiffs/Appellant's cause of action.
RELEVANT FACTS
The Trial Court indicated a bias in asserting that the bringing of the lawsuit was a
matter of perspective because land was falling off of hills in other parts of the City of
Layton by stating, "Fingers are being pointed everywhere..." (Re of Tnscrpt, p. 39). The
Court further felt there was no liability on the part of Defendants/Appellees as Layton
City had approved the building lot. (Re of Tnscrpt, p. 54). Moreover, the Court viewed
the matter as being of public record which would have put Plaintiff/Appellant on notice.
(Re Tnscrpt, p. 55). The Court indicated that prior to subjecting itself to a full blown
trial of the facts, it was the Court's desire to have Appellate Court direction as to what
law to apply. Further, the Court made a finding that there are no disputed facts. (Re
Tnscrpt, p. 92 and 93). Finally, the Court viewed the soils report generated by the soils
engineer for the Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green as being an approval of the
unstable lot for construction which is clearly contrary to the evidence submitted to the
Court (Re Tnscrpt, p. 54).
The Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green had a partnership in the development
of Falcon Ridge Subdivision (Ex. 1 to Plaintiffs Resp. Mem., p. 4). With respect to the
development the Defendant/Appellee Wall contacted Glenn Maughn for a soils report
(pp. 10 & 11). The upshot of the soils report was that a certain distance needed to be
maintained from the hillside (pp. 17 & 18). As to the defect of the land, there was no
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warning placed on the plat of any stated lot requirements (p. 20). Defendant/Appellee
Wall had a discussion with Green after the filing of the lawsuit herein wherein Green
indicated to Wall that he had advised Gary Wright (GMW Development dba Ivory
North) of the setback building requirements (pp. 34 & 43). It was felt by the partnership
that they were making a sale to an experienced builder (p. 37).
The Defendant/Appellee Green had nothing placed in the restrictive covenants as
to the special considerations of Lot 31 which is the lot in question herein (Ex. 2
Plaintiffs Resp. Memo, p. 34). Defendant/Appellee Green spoke with Wright and
advised him to place the house as far South on the lot as possible (p. 36).
The soils report accomplished by Glenn Maughan was very explicit in setting
forth the deficiencies of Lot 31. Among other things, it reflected the scarp as well as the
undercutting of the bank by Kays Creek which lent itself to the instability detailed by Mr.
Maughan. The undercutting had caused what Mr. Maughn described as a land fall, in
other words, a falling away of the land soil by reason of the undercutting of Kays Creek.
His directions were very explicit as to the instability (Ex. 5 & 6, Plaintiffs Resp. Memo).
The lot upon which Plaintiffs/Appellant's residence was built was acquired by
GMW Development dba Ivory North from Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green by
virtue of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement which was variously executed in May and
June of 1995 (Ex. 9 Real Estate Purchase Agreement, Plaintiffs Resp. Memo).
Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell, before signing the first offer of purchase on May 18,
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1995, walked on and looked at Lot 31 of Falcon Ridge Subdivision which lot was
smooth with neither visible defects nor any indication of a scarp, gorge, or unstable
condition and was not informed as to the geological report with the land having been
subject to landslides (See Ex. 8, para 5, p. 2 Plaintiffs Memo in Resp. to SJ.).
Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell knew that Lot 31 was a subdivided lot and that
Defendant/Appellee GMW Development was a professional builder and developer and
he relied upon that judgment and professionalism to allow the lot to be purchased from
Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green (at p. 2, para 6). GMW Development dba Ivory
North selected the placement of the home on the lot and the title was transferred on
December 22, 1995. On April 12, 1998, the PlaintiftfAppellant Fennell first observed
landslides on the North part of the lot which was the first notice to him of any problem
with the lot (At p. 3, para 7 through 9).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In 1991, Plaintiff/Appellant undertook a search to find a suitable residential lot
and have a new home constructed thereon. Plaintiff/Appellant contacted
Defendant/Appellee GMW Development dba Ivory North but the development of Ivory
North did not have a suitable lot for Plaintiffs/Appellant's tastes which the abutting
development of the Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green did have. The lot in question
had been singled out of the development by a soils engineer stating that it was unstable
and recommended that it be utilized as an access road as opposed to a building lot. The
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instability of the lot was an inherent defect which should have been disclosed to
Plaintiff/Appellant. In any event, Plaintiff/Appellant selected that lot and
Defendant/Appellee GMW Development dba Ivory North purchased the lot from
Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green and constructed Plaintiff/Appellant's home
thereon including the lot purchase cost in the value of the cost to Plaintiff/Appellant of
the home construction as a package. Ivory North was advised to place the home as far to
the South from the unstable ground as possible, which did not occur. The
Defendants/Appellees had a duty to disclose the unstable nature of the residential lot,
which did not occur. Further, Defendant/Appellee GMW Development dba Ivory North
as a developer had the same duties as Defendant/Appellees Wall and Green to determine
the suitability of the lot and advise Plaintiff Appellant of any deficiencies. That did not
occur.
The instability of the lot is caused by the undercutting of Kays Creek which
cannot be rectified or prevented.
In February 1998, the hillside fell away from the residential lot. Such was not
discernable by Plaintiff Appellant upon his initial inspection of the lot in that the
unevenness of the scarp had been bladed over and smoothed so that the appearance of the
land was that of a stable and firm residential building lot.
Defendants/Appellees had a duty to provide a stable residential lot to
Plaintiff Appellant without the inherent defect or in the alternative to inform
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Plaintifi7Appellant as to the inherent defect. Having failed to do so the
Plaintiff/Appellant is entitled to remedial relief.
The Court abrogated its duty in determining that it desired a direction from the
Appellate Court as to what law to apply to the facts.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
The applicable law of the case deals with that of actionable willful
misrepresentation or failure to disclose. As to the issue of such tort liability, the common
law obligation is that every person must so act and use that which he controls as not to
injure another. Whether he is acting on his own behalf or for another, an agent who
violates a duty which he owes to a third person is answerable to the injured party for the
consequences. See 3 Am. Jur. 2d. Agency Sec. 309. In this instance, Plaintiff7Appellant
is a third-party injured by the failure of Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green to
adequately record or notate the land defect which resulted in the ultimate damage for
which Plaintiff/Appellant pursues his remedies. Such duty applies as well to
Defendant/Appellee GMW Development dba Ivory North as a contractor subdivider as
defined by 57-11-2 (8), (9), and (10), UCA.
Further statutory authority binding both Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green
relates to Section 48-1-8, Utah Code Annotated. That provides that the admissions of a
partner are binding upon a partnership. Defendant/Appellee Wall acknowledged that one
means of having accomplished the necessary protections would have been to have put in
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the protective covenants that any building on the property should be per the soils reports.
Essentially, Defendant/Appellee Wall acknowledges a duty to disclose and admitted a
failure to having accomplished any such disclosure. However, Defendants/Appellees
Wall and Green both state that a conversation was had with Defendant/Appellee GMW
Development dba Ivory North in the person of Wright advising Wright to place the house
as far south on the lot in order to avoid the issue as to the instability of the soils as far as
the residence was concerned.
Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell seeks damages and equitable relief in his undertaking
the lawsuit herein. The case of Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802 (Utah 1963), supports
the position of Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell in his seeking remedial measures. The case
resulted in the rescission of a land contract purchase for fraud by reason of the failure to
disclose a quarantine on farm ground which materially effected the economic operation
of the farm. Therein was stated "The principle is basic in the law of fraud as it relates to
nondisclosure that a charge of fraud is maintainable where a party who knows material
facts is under a duty, under the circumstances, to speak and disclose information, but
remains silent....", at p.383. The land instability in the instant case is similarly a material
defect as to which there was a duty to disclose.
With the discussion of Defendant/Appellee Green as to the placing of the
residence as far back on the lot as possible, notice inquiry gave rise to a duty on the part
of the Defendant/Appellee GMW Development dba Ivory North in the person of Wright
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to make reasonable inquiry. Wright therefore has responsibility for failing in his "duty to
exercise" reasonable inquiry to insure that a lot is suitable for construction of some type
of dwelling and he must disclose to his purchaser any condition which he knows or
reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lot unsuitable for such. See Loveland v.
Orem City, 746 P.2d 763 (1987 Utah) at 769; UCA 57-11-17.
Furthermore, returning to the issue of liability for negligent representation, privity
of contract is not a necessary prerequisite to liability for negligent misrepresentation. See
Price-Orem Inc. v. Rollins, Brown, & Gunnell, 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986).
Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green are partners and co-developers of Falcon
Ridge Subdivision. The liability of either of them for the partnership is the liability of
both of them in the partnership. Section 48-1-10, UCA; 59 Am. Jur. 2d. Sec. 647 et. seq.
In the present instance, the liability is the wrongful act of either party in failing to assure
the disclosure of the material defect of the scarp of the real estate in question. The
nondisclosure was intentional by omission and indeed the scarp was covered when the
Plaintiff/Appellant walked the property so that such was not discernable. As alleged in
the Complaint, all the elements of fraud are present and are alleged and the intentional
nondisclosure is a wrongful act on the part of the partnership whether accomplished by
Defendants/Appellees Wall or Green. In order for them to have placed
Plaintiff7Appellant on notice, Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green needed to place
information concerning the scarp in the subdivision's restrictive covenants, in the Deed,
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iff/Appellant. None of

that notice was accomplished.
Nor was there any conduct which would have caused inquiry notice to
PlaintiffTAppellant I here were no h< L ni * iiuunsMiii <>s Ikil JIIIM l u u ,\l id J
Plaintiff/Appellant to an) c oncern as to the stability of the property. The term "matter of
public record" includes only those matters identified by statute incident to county
recording and title documents. See First American Title Insurance Company v, J.B.
Ranch i m , %t» II".Jit) K U (I H.ih I'l'Hi)

.•

•
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1lie partnership of Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green had a duty to disclose
the material defect of the land to GMW Development and the failure to do so resulted in
injury to Plaintifi7Appellant herein. From the standpoint of a person injuj w. : L \Q
wrong!MI ml Il < iiilllii i illn u'Liiinnslnp nl'piiik'ip'il .nul ,i" ill i uni * •• *
shiltiu of the w r o n g d o e r in that connection is of n o consequence. 3 A m . Jur. 2d. A g e n c y
Sec. 309.
With Plaintiff/Appellant having walked the property and having inspeclci! il, llicie
1

\.IIIS

in

iisilili' iiiclii:a(iuii ui ;i scarp m ui.sliihilitv Plaintiff/Appellant Pennell thereafter

entered into a contract with GMW for GMW to purchase the lot and pass title to
Plaintiff/Appellant once the home was constructed thereon. Plaintiff7Appellant relied to
his detriment upon the nondisclosure of the soil instability. Essentially thei e & as
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expressed or implied authority for Defendant/Appellee GMW Development dba Ivory
North to act on behalf of the Plaintiff/Appellant in acquiring the property. See Distan v.
Enviro Pack Medical Products, Inc., 833 P.2d 1071 (Utah App. 1995); Zions First
National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988); Walker Bank v.
Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1983).
Summary Judgment is inappropriate as a general proposition to resolve a
negligence claim on its merits, and should be employed only in a most clearcut case. See
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1989), Cert, denied, 789
P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). That case involved a question of fact as to the duty of care of a
Trustee under a Trust Deed and as to whether or not the Trustee had breached a duty it
owed by reconveying a Trust Deed based on a forged authorization. The Court held that
such precluded a Summary Judgment in favor of the Trustee. The Court of Appeals in
Wycalls, at 825, stated,
The Summary Judgment challenged here disposes of what
amounts to a negligence claim by Wycalis against Guardian...
Specifically, Wycalis contends that Guardian breached its duty as
Trustee under the Trust Deed in reconveying Wycalis's interest without
her actual authorization. As a general proposition, summary judgment
is inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on it merits, and should
be employed "only in the most clearcut case." (Citations Omitted). Of
particular concern is the precept that "[o]rdinarily, whether a Defendant
has breached the required standard of care is a question of fact for the
jury." (Citations Omitted). Accordingly, Summary Judgment is
inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is "fixed by law,"
(Citations Omitted) if reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion
as to the Defendant's negligence under the circumstances. (Citations
Omitted). Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has held that since
14

summary disposition denies the losing party "the privilege of a trial,"
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution suggests that "doubt or
uncertainty as to the questions of negligence. .. should be resoh ed in

• •

favor of granting. , . a trial." (Citations Omitted).
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellate Court overturned the Trial Court's granting of a
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Inasmuch as the theoi } ' of i eco\ ei y • :)ii tl le pai it : f tl: i = Plaintiff/. \ ppellant hei eiii Is
11 I »I'd egligent and/or intentional failure to disclose an inherent defect, such should
preclude the Summary Judgment and warrants the overturning of the Trial Court's
granting of the Summary Judgments to Defendants/Appellees.

p

763 (1987 Utah), which discussed the scope of the duty of a nonbuilder/subdivider

(which would be Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green herein) to subdividees and cites
with approval the Wyoming Case of Anderson v Bower, 681 1 '.2d 131 6 (to> oming
l^lvlji 1 11 • i ,'"'I in lei son t;a»(\ supm l)cliiiKliinl,'Mi ^dupei pmio/Iiasal tws iiiTea^e and
subdivided the same into residential building lots. These lots were, in turn, sold to
Defendant builders who constructed homes thereon that were later purchased by eight (8)
Plaintiff owners. Plaintiffs sued the Subdivider/Builder for negligence and bi each of • .
wairanh alia I \ ing oxpenciicril w afa1 soepape info their basements. The Anderson •-.
Court held that "the developer has a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the
subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type ordinary, average dwelling
house; and he must disclose to his purchaser any conditio! I v Iiicli he kno vv s or
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reasonably ought to know makes the unsubdivided lots unsuitable for such residential
building."
The Utah Court in Loveland, supra, at 769, adopted by incorporation the
Anderson case, supra, utilizing the following language, "The duty defined by the
Wyoming Court and our interpretation thereof is consistent with existing Utah Law."
The Utah Court went on to state that the provisions of the Uniform Land Sales Practices
Act are persuasive in fashioning the duty of a subdivider to his vendees. That would
relate to 57-11-7, UCA, which requires Ml and accurate disclosure of physical
characteristics of subdivided land which physical characteristics must be made known to
residential purposes if there are unusual or material circumstances.
Loveland, supra, at page 769, further states "... modern courts have held the
purchasers of real estate may recover from a contractor for his or her negligence despite
the lack of privity."
The recording statute in 57-3-102 UCA, sets forth what would impart notice.
Those requirements relate to recording disclosure as to the scarp which is the nature of
the material and unusual circumstance as to the lot of Plaintiff7Appellatit Fennell herein.
Such notice could only be imparted by a notation on the deed of transference, a notation
on the development plat, or specific written notice to Plaintiff7Appellant Fennell, none of
which were present herein.
To revisit Elder v. Clawson, supra at 383 "the proposition that whether a duty to
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speak exists is determinable by reference to all the circumstances of the case and by
C 0 i ; i [ a n ML.
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A s applicable to the case herein, the scarp and instability of the land bore directly
upon the suitability of the property for the construction of the residence of
Plaintiff7Appellant Fennell.
1
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Gavrilovich,

594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979). In Stepanov, supra, at 35, the Court recited,

"One of those controls (of large scale subdividers) is civil liability when subdividers fail
to disclose to a purchaser a < ..
ft: ost \ \ ii ich ad \ erselj <
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specifically recited in Loveland,
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supra, and goes to an implied warranty of suitability, or

in (liis case, usability of the residential lot for its expressed purpose.
) <jrt)iv:i iii developing tne duty or disclosure, „
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dividers.

Defendants/Appellees were developing abutting large developments. In the process of
doing so, Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green obtained a soils report which disclosed
the unstable soil romliluin

VI illiiuiilli lliic .lilulois dust Insnu h\ tn uidini* pics liiii !

a v i f a i lilt purchaser ofsiidi Innd, Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell herein,- is not subjected to
caveat emptor by reason of the inherent defect that was not readily discernable by
Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell in the exercise of reasonable care. See Mitchell v.

Christensen, 429 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (SC 2001). Mitchell, supra, goes on to recite the
Ohio case dealing with specialized knowledge in the field of construction or real estate.
Mitchell, supra, at 16, so posited and went on to say, "See, e.g., Tipton v. Nuzum, 616
N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ohio Ct App.1992) (holding that "buyers should be accorded 'the
benefit of comparison with ordinarily prudent persons of their station and experience
confronted by the same or similar circumstances'" {Trovers v. Long 135 N.E.2d 256, 259
(Ohio 1956)); Quashnockv. Frost, 445 A.2d 121, 127 (PA Super Ct 1982) (Finding duty
of disclosure where defect would not have been discoverable by an ({'ordinary
inexperienced person"))', See also, Restatement 2d of Torts, Sec. 551 CMT. 1, illus.9
(1977) (Stating that duty to disclose defects exists where "A- knows that B is not aware of
(the defect), that he could not discover it by an ordinary inspection, and that he would
not make the purchase if he knew it"); 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit Sec. 158, at 217
(1968) (Stating that the buyer of property cannot charge the seller with fraud for failure
to disclose a defect if the defect "could be discovered by such an examination as a careful
and prudent man would ordinarily make"). Having said that, Defendant/Appellee GMW
dba Ivory North, even for purposes of argument having not been advised of the
instability of the land, was of "sufficient and similar expertise" as that of
Defendants/Appellees of Wall and Green and therefore had a greater duty of care and
indeed should be held to the notice as to the soils report disclosed with
Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green having filed the soils report with the Layton City
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Offices.

Clawson,
There [is] no occasion for [purchasers] to make an independent
investigation of a [problem] of which they kn [o]w nothing." 14 IIt all
2d 379, 382, 384 P.2d 802, 804 (1963) "
In exjii)"i(ii(»ij;» ilif 11u in: i i ( 'nui I \ initial basis for the granting of the Summary
Judgment, the ruling was that because the Plaintiff/Appellant did not line item for line
item repeat and contest the fact statement of Defendant/Appellee Green, that fact
statement was taken as

uncontroverted.

I he Cc i ii I: in so n llii lg abrogated its-duties as the Trial Court in what would
ultimately be the finder of fact. The code of judicial administration is not meant to create
or modify substantive rights of litigants but to bring order to the manner in which the
Courts operate. SeeAin-n i 1/II/HM III11'1"' ni.ili
994 P

pp h'i

ll

^0 I' Jci 'III I nil <l< nn il

"71 (Utah 1999), Therein, the I Jtah Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of

a Motion for Summary Judgment as the nonmovant failed to file counter Affidavits and
other evidentiary materials in response to the Motion for Summary Judgment

1

s is

for Summary Judgment, substantial evidentiary material was submitted including the
Affidavit of Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell, excerpts of depositions of the parties
Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green, deposition of the soils engineer, the soils
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engineer report, and a soil disputation of the fact position of the Defendant/Appellee
Green.
Scott, supra, at 217, went on to recite,
The purpose of the Code of Judicial Administration is to bring
order to the manner in which the Courts operate. They are not intended
to, nor do they, create or modify substantive rights of litigants... Cf.
Hartford Leasing Corporation., 888 P.2d. at 702.
By way of further elucidation, Scott dealt with a real estate purchase contract
whereby the purchaser sued for specific performance. The Appellate Court granted same
to purchaser and affirming the conveyance of the property to purchaser. The decision
was based upon the fact that the Defendant/Appellee in the Scott matter failed to file
counter Affidavits or other evidentiary materials as required by Rule 56 (e).
The specific provisions upon which the Court relied in its treatment of the motions
under Rule 4-501, CJA, were "contains a verbatim restatement" and "and, if applicable,
shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed."
In both instances, this precise language was the November 2001, amendment. N.B. The
motions were filed and responded to in the spring of 2001, and argument on the matter
was held October 25, 2001. A fortiori, this appeal is warranted based upon the Trial
Court's premature and precipitous application of the rule.
Applying those circumstances to the case herein, the Court abused its discretion in
refusing to acknowledge the Memorandum of Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell controverting
the Memorandum of Defendant/Appellee Green.
20

In dealing with a Motion for Summary Judgment, the adverse part)' is entillul lo

therefrom in the light most favorable to the adverse party. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel,
123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953); Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 16 I Jtah 2d 305
395 1 \2( 162(196 1 ):; Bowen v. Riverton C ity, 656 I 2d = 1 35(1 Jul : ih 1982) Fi if till: u : t:
submission1* HI • ipp nil m nppnsiiinn hi a Motion (or Summary J udgment should b e
looked at in the light favorable to the nonmoving parties position. Duram v. Margetts,
557 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors,
A 2 \\ I kiln 1 1 , ; \\\\\ I11 "KM |i

•

•

. .

Inc., 16! I1 d

. . ' '
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff/Appellant seeks the reversal of the Trial Court's granting of the
Defendants/Appellants' Motions for Summary Judgment.

F R A N K M. W E L L S
Attorney for Plaintiff?Appellant

~

CERTIFICA TE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above-entitled
Docking Statement has been served upon the Defendants by placing same in the US
Postal Service, postage prepaid this 11th day of January, 2002, to:
Paul Belnap
Andrew D. Wright
Attorneys for Defendant Green
Sixth Floor
Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Elizabeth Hruby-Mills
Brandon B. Hobbs
Attorneys for Defendant Wall
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5506
Dave Hamilton
Another attorney for Neil Wall
4723 Harrison Blvd. #200
Ogden, Utah 84403
Barbara Berrett
Shane Norris
Attorneys for Defendant GMW
Key Bank Tower
50 South Main Street, Ste. 530
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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ADDENDUM

Paul M. Belnap, #0279
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant,
Edward D. Green
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES ASHLEY FENNELL, U,
Plaintiff.
vs.

EDWARD D. GREEN, NEIL WALL, aka
NEIL J. WALL and GMW DEVELOPMENT,
INC.. dba IVORY NORTH,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSAL OF EDWARD D.
GREEN AND NEIL WALL, aka
NEIL J. WALL
Civil No. 000601295 PD
Judge Thomas L. Kay

Defendant
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 25th day of October, 2001 at the
hour of 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District Court Judge on motions for
summary judgment, including motions for summary judgment filed by Edward D. Green and
Neil Wall, aka Neil J. Wall (hereinafter "Green and Wall").
The plaintiff was represented by his counsel of record and the defendants were
represented by their counsel of record.
The Court reviewed the memoranda in support of and in opposition to the motions

and has reviewed the case law cited by the parties and having considered the same and the oral
argument of counsel presented in favor o'f and in opposition to the motions, determined that the
motions for summary judgment of Green and Wall should be and are hereby granted, dismissing
the complaint of the plaintiff against them. The Court desires to set forth its reasoning for the
granting of the motions for summary judgment of Green and Wall and provided explanation for
the same at the time of ruling on the motions at the hearing and confirms the same as the basis
for its ruling together with this statement of the reasons in this written Order.
1. The time of the motions for summary judgment was appropriate as the parties had
completed their discovery in this case giving the attorneys the opportunity to know the issues and
facts.
2. The Court believes that under the terms of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, together with Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, that summary
judgment is warranted as the court determinesfromthe pleadingsfiledand the matters presented
that there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and that Green and Wall are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
3. Rule 4-501(2)(B) is a rule that this Court has relied upon and does so in this case
as a separate basis for the granting of the motions for summary judgment dismissing Green and
Wall. In the materialsfiledby Green and Wall in support of their motions, said parties listed the
facts by paragraphs which they contended were not in dispute. The rule required the plaintiff to
set forth specifically:
[A] concise statement of material facts as to which the party
contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be
9

stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically
refer to those portions of die record upon which the
opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the
numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that
are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference
to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the
opposing party's statement
The Court determines that the plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B) and
therefore the facts set forth in the memorandafiledby Green and Wall in support of their motions
are deemed admitted and make summary judgment proper under the facts and circumstances of
the legal arguments made.
4. As a separate basis for the granting of the motions of Green and Wall, the Court
has reviewed Exhibit 4 to the deposition ofNeil J. Wall together with the deposition referred to
and referenced by the parties of Glenn Roy Maughan. The Court determines that there are no
genuine issues as to any material facts regarding the fact that at the time Maughan performed his
soils studies on the lots in the proposed subdivision, including Lot 21, which became Lot 31 on
the subsequent plan (see deposition Exhibits 1 and 5 of the Deposition of Neil J. Wall), Maughan
was of the opinion that the area of the hill on the north side of Lot 31 was not a landslide.
Accordingly. Green and Wall did not have knowledge of an alleged landslide condition as
plaintiff now alleges, at the time that the subdivision was platted and the subject lot was sold to
defendants GMW and Ivory North. Therefore, Green and Wall did not fail to disclose the alleged
landslide condition now complained of by the plaintiff- This court determines from the facts

3

deemed admitted together with the facts set forth in Exhibit 4 of the Neil J. Wall deposition and
the deposition of Glenn Roy Maughan, do not indicate there was a landslide condition that would
have been known to Green and Wall at the times in question, as alleged by the plaintiffs.
5. As a matter of law, plaintiff has alsofoiledto state a claim in his pleadings for
fraudulent non-disclosure and further, even if such a cause of action had been pled, there has
been a failure to establish that the alleged non-disclosed information was known to Green and
Wall. Further, plaintiff has failed to establish a legal duty on the part Green and Wall to
communicate with the plaintiff.
6. It is undisputed that Green and Wall did not sell the subject lot to the plaintiff, and
plaintiff has failed to establish facts from which this court would find a legal duty to the plaintiff.
7. In the case before this court, the only issues of damage involved are those of
economic loss for which no recovery is available under the theories pled by the plaintiff in this
action, whether in negligence or alleged warranty proposed by plaintiff.
8. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with a basis to determine that there were any
concealed conditions known to Green and Wall at the time of the sale to GMW/Ivory and further,
the plaintiff was outside the land at the time of the damages alleged. Therefore, the exceptions to
the doctrine of caveat emptor, urged by plaintiff do not exist in this case. Accordingly, the Court
determines that the cases cited and relied upon by the parties support the granting of summary
judgment to Green and Wall.
9. The Court has spent considerable time reviewing the memoranda of the parties
4

and the case law and in ruling on the motions at the subject hearing did so, having first fully
reviewed all matters submitted and having considered the oral argument of counsel and the legal
precedent and rules stated herein. Therefore, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motions for
Summary Judgment of Green and Wall are granted and the claims of the plaintiff against Green
and Wall are hereby dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendants.
DATED this

day of November, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

Thomas L. Kay
Second District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

Py^LaVarE. Stark
|
Attorney for Plaintiff
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BARBARA K. BERRETT (A4273)
SHANE W. NORRIS (A8097)
BERRETT & PETTY, L.C.
Attorneys for GMW Development, Inc.,
d/b/a Ivory North
Key Bank Tower, Suite 530
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 531-7733
Facsimile: (801) 531-7711
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES ASHLEY FENNELL, H.
Plaintiff,
vs.
EDWARD D. GREEN, NEIL WALL, a/k/a
NEIL J. WALL and GMW
DEVELOPMENT, INC., d/b/a IVORY
NORTH,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSAL OF GMW DEVELOPMENT,
INC., dba IVORY NORTH

Civil No. 000601295 PD
Judge Thomas Kay

Defendants.

Defendant GMW Development, Inc. d/b/a Ivory North ("Ivory North") filed a
motion for summary judgment, seeking judgment as a matter of law on all of plaintiffs' causes of
action against defendant Ivory North.
Defendant Ivory North's motion for summary judgment came on regularly for
hearing on October 25, 2001. Plaintiff was represented by LaVar E. Stark and Frank M. Wells.

Defendant Ivory North was represented by Shane W. Norris. Defendant Neil Wall was
represented by Elizabeth Hruby-Mills, Defendant Edward D. Green was represented by Paul M.
Belnap.
The Court reviewed the submitted memoranda and heard the oral argument of counsel.
Based on the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth in the memoranda filed by Ivory Norths
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
14

Defendant Ivory North's motion for summary judgment is granted on all

causes of action.
This Court further holds that
2.

Once discovery is completed and issues are fully developed, motions for

summary judgment are proper.
3.

Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration is applicable, and that a

non-moving party must dispute the factual statements set forth by the moving party in order to
defeat a motion for summary judgment
4.

The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to property dispute the relevant

facts set forth in Ivory North's Motion for Summary Judgment and therefore Ivory North's
Statement of Undisputed Facts are deemed admitted due to the lack of response.
5.

Ivory North's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted based upon

plaintiffs failure to dispute the relevant facts set forth in Ivory North's Motion for Summary

2

Judgment.
6.

Specifically, this Court finds that it is undisputed that Ivory North had no

knowledge of any geological condition on the subject property, had no knowledge of the
Maughan report or evaluation of the subject property, and had no knowledge of the possibility of
the subject property being the site of potential landslides.
7.

Additionally, Maughan stated that the subject property was not a landslide

area in deposition, therefore no defendants had any knowledge of the subject property being the
site of potential landslides.
8.

Finally, this Court finds that regardless of the knowledge of the

defendants, plaintiff cannot claim economic damages for negligence.
9.

Plaintiffs claim for breach of implied warranty must fail based upon the

lack of implied warranty in Utah law for residential property.
DATED this

of December, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

Thomas L. Kay
Second District Court Judge
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57-11-7. PubKc offering statement — Contents — Restrictions on use — Alteration or amendments.
(1) Every public offering statement shall disclose completely and accurately
to prospective purchasers:
(a) the physical characteristics of the subdivided lands offered; and
(b) unusual and material circumstances or features affecting the subdivided lands.
(2) The proposed public offering statement submitted to the division shall be
in a form prescribed by its rules and, unless otherwise provided by the division,
shall include the following:
(a) the name and principal address of the subdivider and the name and
principal address of each officer, director, general partner, other principal,
or person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions as
defined by the rules of the division if the subdivider is a person other than
an individual;
(b) a general description of the subdivided lands stating the total
number of units in the offering;
(c) a statement summarizing in one place the significant terms of any
encumbrances, easements, hens, severed interests, and restrictions, including zoning and other regulations affecting the subdivided lands and
each unit, and a statement of all existing or proposed taxes or special
assessments which affect the subdivided lands;
(d) a statement of the use for which the property is offered;
(e) information concerning:
(i) any improvements, including streets, curbs, and gutters, sidewalks, water supply including a supply of culinary water, drainage
and flood control systems, irrigation systems, sewage disposal facilities, and customary utilities;
(ii) the estimated cost to the purchaser, the estimated date of
completion, and the responsibility for construction and maintenance
of existing and proposed improvements which are referred to in
connection with the offering or disposition; and
(iii) if for any reason any of the improvements described in Subsections (i) and (ii) cannot presently be constructed or maintained, a
statement clearly setting forth this fact and giving the reasons
therefor,
(f) (i) a statement of existing zoning or other planned land use designation of each unit and the proposed use of each unit in the
subdivision including uses as residential dwellings, agriculture,
churches, schools, low density apartments, high density apartments
and hotels, and a subdivision map showing the proposed use, the
zoning, or other planned land use designation, unless each unit has
the same proposed use, zoning, or other planned land use designation;
(ii) if the subdivision consists of more than one tract or other
smaller division, the information and map required by Subsection (i)
need only pertain to the tract or smaller division in which the units
offered for disposition are located;
(g) a map, which need not be drawn to scale, enabling one unfamiliar
with the area in which the subdivision is located to reach the subdivision
by road or other thoroughfare from a nearby town or city;
392
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(h) (i) the boundary, course, dimensions, and intended use of the
right-of-way and easement grants of record;
(ii) the location of existing underground and utility facilities; and
(iii) any conditions or restrictions governing the location of the
facilities within the right-of-way, and easement grants of record, and
utility facilities within the subdivision; and
(i) any additional information the division may require to assure full
and fair disclosure to prospective purchasers.
(3) (a) The public offering statement may not be used for any promotional
purposes either before registration of the subdivided lands or before the
date the statement becomes effective.
(b) The statement may be used after it becomes effective only if it is
used in its entirety.
(c) A person may not advertise or represent that the division aipproves
or recommends the subdivided lands or their disposition.
(d) No portion of the public offering statement may be underscored,
italicized, or printed in larger, heavier, or different color type than the
remainder of the statement, unless the division requires it.
(4) (a) The division may require the subdivider to alter or amend the
proposed public offering statement in order to assure full smd fair
disclosure to prospective purchasers.
(b) A change in the substance of the promotional plan or plan of
disposition or development of the subdivision may not be made after
registration without notifying and receiving approval of the division and
without making appropriate amendment of the public offering statement.
(c) A public offering statement is not current unless:
(i) all amendments are incorporated;
(ii) the subdivider has timely filed each renewal report required by
Section 57-11-10; and
(iii) no cease and desist order issued pursuant to this chapter is in
effect.
(5) The subdivider must notify the division within five working days if he is
convicted of a crime involving fraud, deception, false pretenses, misrepresentation, false advertising, or dishonest dealing in real estate transactions, or
has been subject to any injunction or administrative order restraining a false
or misleading promotional plan involving land dispositions.
(6) The subdivider must notify the division within five working days if the
person which owns the subdivided lands files a petition in bankruptcy or if any
other event occurs which may have a material adverse effect on the subdivision.
History: L. 1973, ch. 158, § 7; 1991, ch.
165, § 2; 1995, ch. 180, § 6.

57-11-8. Examination by division on application for registration.
Upon receipt of an application for registration in proper form, the division
shall immediately initiate an examination to determine whether:
(1) the requirements of Sections 57-11-6 and 57-11-7 have been satisfied;
393
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Rule 4-408.01. Responsibility for administration of tria
courts.
Intent:
To designate the court locations administered directly through the admin
istrative office of the courts and those administered through contract with loca
government pursuant to § 78-3-21.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record and to the administratis
office of the courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) All locations of the juvenile court shall be administered directly througl
the administrative office of the courts.
(2) All locations of the district court shall be administered directly througl
the administrative office of the courts, except the following, which shall b<
administered through contract with county or municipal government pursuan
to § 78-3-21: Fillmore, Junction, Kanab, Loa, Manila, Manti, Morgan
Panguitch, Randolph, and Salem.
(Added effective November 15, 1995; amended effective January 27, 1997
November 1, 1998; November 1, 2001.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment deleted "Beaver" before "Coalville" m
Subdivision (2).

The 2001 amendment deleted "Coalville" an<
"Park City" from the list m Subdivision (2).

ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings oi
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record excep
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rul<
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary
relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested o
ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points an<
authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number t
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon ii
support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall no
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" a
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-part
application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memoran
dum, the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, an<
if the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application shall include <
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall fil
and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, <
memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motioi
within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify th
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clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph
(1XD) of this rule.
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's memorandum.
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period
to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in the form of a
separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The
Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion was
served, the date the memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, the date
the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties.
If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the
movant relies.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as
to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise
statement of material facts which support the party's contention. Each
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party
relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the
opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
ordered by the court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs
(3)(B) or (4) below.
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or
any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time
of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion
may file a written request for a hearing.
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion
or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively
decided.
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the
matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter shall be
heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing and
notify all parties of the date and time.
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion,
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or
opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least
two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing.
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court.
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file
their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived.
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(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the
scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date
without leave of the court.
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party fails to file a
memorandum in opposition, the moving party may withdraw the request or
the court on its own motion may strike the request and decide the motion
without oral argument.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request
may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and
the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996;
November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2001.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment substituted "trial courts of record" for
"district courts" in the applicability paragraph,
added Subdivision (3)(h), and made a stylistic
change.
The 1999 amendment substituted "claim" for
"issues" in Subdivision (3)(B).
The April 2001 amendment added the second
sentence to Subdivision (1)(D) and made stylistic changes in the subdivision designations.

FTI
The November 2001 amendment, in Subdivision (2)(B), at the end of the first sentence
'substituted the language beginning "contains a
verbatim restatement" for "a concise statement
of material facts as to which the party contends
a genuine issue exists" and deleted "and, if
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence
jor sentences of the movant's facts that are
disputed" at the end of the second sentence.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Decisions sua sponte.
Purpose.
Request for hearing.
Supplemental memoranda.
When rule applies.
Cited.
Decisions sua sponte.
While a court may refrain from addressing a
matter that is not submitted for decision under
this rule, nothing in this rule or any other rule
bars a court from deciding such a matter sua
sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980
P.2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah
1999).
No notice to submit for decision under this
rule is required, and a trial therefore correctly
determined that it could rule on pending motions sua sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App
139, 980 P.2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271
(Utah 1999).
Purpose.
The purpose of the code of judicial administration is not to create or modify substantive
rights of litigants, but to bring order to the
manner in which the courts operate. Scott v.
Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 P.2d 214, cert,
denied, 994 P2d 1271 (Utah 1999).
Request for hearing.
Once a request for hearing by one of the
parties has been granted and the matter set for
hearing, the other party has a right to rely upon
such setting regardless of whether it made its

own request. Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251
(Utah 1997).
Supplemental memoranda.
The plural "memoranda" in Subdivision (lXa)
refers to all memoranda received by the court
— from all parties that either oppose or support
any motion — and does not mean that each
party may submit more than one memorandum; thus, the trial court was well within its
discretion in refusing to accept a supplemental
memorandum that was submitted without
prior invitation and outside the bounds of procedural rules. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State,
888 P.2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
When rule applies.
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a
separate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff
should have been given ten days to respond, as
prescribed by Subdivision QXb) of this rule.
Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 R2d 1205 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
Even though the trial court had considered
both parties' motions and memoranda for and
against the award of attorney fees, it erred in
entering its decision before the time allowed
under this rule to file a reply memorandum had
expired and in not reconsidering its decision by
reviewing plaintiffs' reply memorandum and
revised affidavits. American Vending Servs.,
Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).

